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STATE MAY EXCLUDE ALIENS FROM POLICE FORCE
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)
In Foley v. Connelie,I the Supreme Court signaled the erosion of ju-
dicial recognition of alienage as a suspect classification in determining
the constitutionality of state employment statutes discriminating
against aliens.2
Plaintiff, a lawfully admitted resident alien,3 challenged the constitu-
tionality of a New York statute restricting the appointment of members
of the state police force to United States citizens.4 A three-judge dis-
trict court' denied plaintiff's claim that the statute violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,6 finding a compelling
and substantial state interest in limiting membership in its police force
to citizens.7 The United States Supreme Court affirmed and held the
rational basis test is the appropriate equal protection standard of re-
view for state employment statutes excluding aliens from positions re-
quiring the discretionary execution of public policy.' Accordingly, the
New York state police employment statute is constitutional because
"citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands" of the
position.9
The fourteenth amendment provides that "[njo state shall. . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."10
1. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
2. "The term 'alien' refers to any person not a citizen or national of the United States."
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1l101(a)(3) (1976).
3. The term, "resident alien," refers to a noncitizen lawfully residing in the United States in
accordance with the procedures established by federal statutes regulating immigration and natu-
ralization. See id. §§ 101, 245, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a), 1255(a) (1976).
4. N.Y. Exac. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part: "No per-
son shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United
States ......
5. 419 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. 419 F. Supp. at 898.
8. 435 U.S. at 296.
9. I.d at 300.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNO,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519 (1978); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949).
Traditionally, judicial review of statutory classifications challenged as violative of the equal
protection guarantee has proceeded along a two-tiered analytical path. Legislation that discrimi-
nates against classes particularly burdened is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See United States
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Historically, courts have accorded resident aliens the protection of the
equal protection clause."' Originally, this required that statutory
classifications based on alienage bear a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate legislative end. 2 Thus, by the early twentieth century, states
v Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (Stone, C.J.) ("prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry"). These classifications, considered to be "sus-
pect," must serve a "compelling," "overriding," or "substantial" state interest to withstand an
equal protection challenge to their validity. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973)
("substantial" state interest required to prohibit aliens from membership in the bar); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) ("compelling" interest required to sustain classification
based on alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) ("overriding statutory pur-
pose" required to sustain racial classification). See generally Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term-Foreword" In Defense of the 4ntidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7 (1976);
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term--Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court." A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); Knoppke-Wetzel,
Emplorment Restrictions and the Practice of Law by Aliens in the United States and Abroad, 1974
Duke L.J. 871, 879-80; Tussman & tenBroek, supra, at 356; Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1088 (1969); Note, Equal Protection Review of State Statutes
Restricting Alien Employment, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 92, 93 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Equal Pro-
tection Review]; Comment, Aliens' Right to Work-- State and Federal Discrimination, 45 FORDHAM
L REV. 835, 839 (1977); Note, Wandering Between Two Worlds: Employment Discrimination
Against Aliens, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 355, 363-67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Employment Discrimina-
tion Against Aliens]; 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 140, 141-43.
The Court has also given heightened judicial solicitude to legislative classifications that impair
fundamental rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(nght to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy).
A presumption of constitutionality applies to statutory classifications that do not trigger strict
scrutiny. Such statutes need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative end. See,
eg., Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
483-87 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949); Lindsley v. National Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
11. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 719-20 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (197 1); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See generally Comment, The
Constitutionality of Employment Restrictions on Resident Aliens in the United States, 24 BUFFALO
L. REV. 211, 212 (1974); Comment, supra note 10, at 838; Comment, Aliens, Employment, and
Equal Protection, 19 VILL. L. REV. 589, 590 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Aliens, Employment, and
Equal Protection].
Lawfully admitted resident aliens are "persons" within the meaning of the fifth amendment,
U.S. CONST. amend. V, and may not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due process
of law." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
(1953).
12. See, eg., Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923);
Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v.
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effectively limited aliens' access to employment. The courts upheld
statutory prohibitions on alien employment because of the state's pro-
prietary interest in the public domain 3 and as a legitimate exercise of
the state's police power to regulate harmful or dangerous occupa-
tions. 4 By 1915, however, the Supreme Court recognized that the
state's interest in the conservation of its resources and the protection of
its citizens did not justify the deprivation of aliens' rights to work in
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Blythe v. Hinckley,
180 U.S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1879).
13. See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915) (preference to citizens for public works
contracts); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1914) (prohibiting aliens from killing
wild game); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 341 (1901) (restriction on devolution of property to
aliens); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (same); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391,
396 (1876) (restricting oyster planting to citizens); People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427
(Cardozo, J.) (prohibiting alien employment on public works), q"dsub nom. Crane v. New York,
239 U.S. 195 (1915). "The state in determining what use shall be made of its own moneys may
legitimately consult the welfare of its own citizens rather than that of aliens." Id at 164, 108 N.E.
at 429. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 10, at 376; Note, Constitutionality ofRestric.
tions ofAliens'Right to Work, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1012, 1014-19 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Aliens'
Right to Work]; EqualProtection Review, supra note 10, at 95-97; Comment, supra note 10, at 839-
40 & n.34; Aliens, Employment, and Equal Protection, supra note 11, at 591-94; Employment Dis.
crimination Against Aliens, supra note 10, at 361.
Several state courts reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hilton, 174 Mass.
29, 54 N.E. 362 (1899) (upheld statute prohibiting aliens from obtaining fishing license); Alsos v.
Kendall, 111 Ore. 359, 227 P. 286 (1924) (same); State v. Kofines, 33 R.I. 211, 80 A. 432 (1911)
(same); Bondi v. Mackay, 87 Vt. 271, 89 A. 228 (1913) (upheld discriminatory fees for aliens'
hunting and fishing licenses).
14. See, e.g., Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (operating pool halls); Crane v, New
York, 239 U.S. 195, aft'g 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915) (public works contracts); Anton v.
Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (D. Ore. 1924) (operating pool halls); Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A.
905 (1890) (selling liquor); Commonwealth v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907) (peddling);
Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149 N.W. 9 (1914) (auctioneers); Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19,
29 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (massage parlor operator); Miller v. Niagara Falls, 207 App. Div.
798, 202 N.Y.S. 549 (4th Dep't 1924) (soft drink sales); State v. Ellis, 181 Ore. 615, 184 P.2d 860
(1947) (barbers); Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 44 R.I. 333, 117 A. 359 (1922) (motor bus operators);
Cornelius v. City of Seattle, 123 Wash. 550, 213 P. 17 (1923) (collecting and removing hogfeed),
rev'dsub non Herriot v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 48, 500 P.2d 101 (1972) (en banc). But see
State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165 (1900) (statute barring aliens from working as ped-
dlers held unconstitutional); Sundram v. Niagara Falls, 77 Misc. 2d 1002, 357 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup.
Ct. 1973) (ordinance limiting licensing of taxicab drivers to citizens held unconstitutional), aff'd
merm., 44 App. Div. 2d 906, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (Sup. Ct. 1974). See generally Aliens' Right to
Work, supra note 13, at 1021-27; EqualProtection Review, supra note 10, at 97; Comment, supra
note 10, at 841 nn.40-41; Employment Dircrimination Against Aliens, supra note 10, at 361-63. See
also Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1972) (en banc) (statute requiring citizenship as prerequisite for admission to bar held un-
constitutional).
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"the common occupations of the community." 5
With these public interest doctrines substantially discredited, the
Supreme Court in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission'6 signaled
judicial recognition of alienage as a suspect classification.' 7 Twenty-
three years later, in Graham v. Richardson,8 the Court dispelled all
doubts about the "suspect" nature of state statutes classifying solely on
the basis of alienage.' 9 Accordingly, "aliens as a class constitute a
prime example of a 'discrete and insular minority' for whom height-
ened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 20 State statutes classifying on
15. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,41 (1915). The Court held invalid an Arizona statute requir-
mg that 80 percent of all employees in businesses with more than five employees be citizens.
It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occu-
pations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity
that it was the purpose of the [fourteenth] Amendment to secure. . . . If this could be
refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any
person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words.
Id (citations omitted).
16. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
17. In Takahashi, the Court struck down a California statute prohibiting aliens ineligible for
citizenship to obtain a commercial fishing license, holding that congressional dominance in the
field of immigration and naturalization precluded the state from enacting conflicting legislation.
Id at 418-19. The Court's language also indicated the seed of a stricter scrutiny of legislative
classifications based on alienage: "[Tihe power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits." Id at 420. See Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 n.9 (1969). See
generally Comment, supra note 10, at 838-39.
18. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
19. Id at 371-76.
20. Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
See general, Das, Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens-The Impact of the Constitution
and Civil Rights Laws, 35 U. PITT. L. REv. 499 (1974); Rosales, Resident Aliens and the Right to
Work The Questfor Equal Protection, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1029 (1975); Equal Protection
Review, supra note 10; Comment, supra note 10; Aliens, Employment, and Equal Protection, supra
note 11; Employment Discrimination Against Aliens, supra note 10; 2 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
101 (1978). For a general discussion of the case law before 1971, see M. KoNvTZ, THE ALIEN
AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946); Aliens'Right to Work, supra note 13; Note, Protec-
tion ofAliens'Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1971 DUKE L.J. 583; 1970 UTAH L. RE.
136.
The Court in Graham also held that the state law encroached upon exclusive federal power and
was thus invalid. 403 U.S. at 376-80. Courts have recognized the plenary federal power over
immigration and naturalization. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941): "[Wlhere the fed-
eral government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete
scheme of regulation.., states cannot inconsistently with the purpose of Congress... interfere
with... the federal law. ... Id at 66-67. Accord, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
95-105 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-56
(1976); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 4; id cl. 3; id art. VI, § 2. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrUTION 269 (1972); Comment, supra note 10, at 848-55; 10 DUQ. L.
REv. 280, 280-81 (1971).
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the basis of alienage thus bear a heavy burden of justification;21 courts
have held such statutes invalid for failure to demonstrate a compelling
interest 22 or to choose a less burdensome means of achieving that
interest.23
In resolving public employment discrimination issues, courts seek an
accommodation between the substantial state interest in defining its
"political community" 24 and the equal protection doctrine of strict ju-
dicial scrutiny for classifications based on alienage.25 The Court, fac-
ing the issue squarely in Sugarman v. Dougall,26 recognized in dictum
the states' substantial interest in restricting to citizens "an appropriately
21. See note 10 supra.
22. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd., 429 U.S. 1031 (1977), affg C.D.R. Enter-
prises, Ltd. v. Board of Educ., 412 F. Supp. 1164, 1170-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (public works em-
ployee); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605-06 (1976) (engineers); Mohamed v.
Parks, 352 F. Supp. 518, 520-21 (D. Mass. 1973) (municipal employees); Arias v. Examining Bd.,
353 F. Supp. 857, 861-62 (D.P.R. 1972) (refrigeration and air conditioning technicians); Raffaelli
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 294-96, 303-04, 496 P.2d 1264, 1269-70, 1275, 101
Cal. Rptr. 896, 901-02, 907 (1972) (attorneys).
23. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 725-27 (1973) (fitness for practice of law can be
determined on a case-by-case basis through interviewing and administration of loyalty oaths);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (court critical of statutes neither "narrowly con-
fined" nor "precisely drawn" that exclude all aliens from all classes of the state competitive civil
service). See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976).
24. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1975) (state has power to preserve conception of
political community by 4imiting voting franchise to residents). For further discussion of this iden-
tity between a state and its citizens, see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1973);
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1876); United States
v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 978 (5th Cir. 1975); Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D.
Md. 1974), afJdmem., 426 U.S. 913 (1976); Appellee's Brief at 10, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978). See general, Das, supra note 20, at 519-24; Comment, supra note 10, at 841-42; Employ.
ment Discrimination Against Aliens, supra note 10, at 360.
25. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See notes 16-23 .wpra and accompanying
text.
26. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). In Sugarman, the Court held invalid a New York statute providing
that "no person shall be eligible for appointment for any position in the competitive class unless
he is a citizen." N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 53(1) (McKinney 1973). The Court held the statute
overbroad, "neither narrowly confined nor precise in its application" and thus a violation of the
equal protection clause. 413 U.S. at 643.
One commentator has suggested that despite the strict scrutiny applied, the absence of the term
"suspect" classification from the Court's analysis suggests an intermediate standard of review or
"demonstrable basis standard." The Court's reliance upon an overbreadth analysis to defeat the
statute indicates an examination of both the means and the ends of the statute. Nowak, Realigning
the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permis.
sive Classofcations, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1097-99 (1974). For a general discussion of overbreadth
analysis, see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 10.
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defined class of positions '  necessary to preserve the "basic conception
of a political community."28 A companion case, In re Groiths,29 indi-
cated the limited scope of the Sugarman dictum. Though lawyers per-
form an important public and political role,3" they are not "so close to
the core of the political process" as to fall within the Sugarman
exception .3
Numerous federal court decisions followed or anticipated the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sugarman and Grpfths. Consequently,
courts invalidated similar statutes barring aliens from a variety of occu-
pations.32  These decisions reflect the narrow reading given the
27. 413 U.S. at 647. The Court defined this class as comprising "state elective or important
nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions [and] officers who participate directly in
the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy [or] perform functions that go to the
heart of representative government." Id
28. Id (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1975)). See note 24 supra.
29. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
30. Id at 729. Justice Rehnquist dissented in both Sugarman and Griths, noting that the
purpose of the fourteenth amendment is to prevent discrimination on the basis of race or other
immutable characteristics. Alienage, on the other hand, is alterable by naturalization. 413 U.S. at
657. Justice Rehnquist also found a rational basis for statutory classifications based on alienage:
"It is not irrational to assume that aliens as a class are not familiar with how we as individuals
treat others and how we expect 'government' to treat us." Id at 662. See notes 57-58 infra and
accompanying text.
31. 413 U.S. at 729. Accord, In re Park, 484 P.2d 690, 695 (Alas. 1971); Raffaelli v. Commit-
tee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 296, 496 P.2d 1264, 1270, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 902 (1972).
Contra, Exparte Thompson, 10 N.C. (I Hawks) 355, 363 (1824). See generally Comment, supra
note 10, at 835, 844.
The underlying premise of Groiths is that an alien, like a citizen, may be unfit for the practice
of law. There are more precise ways, however, of determining fitness than a complete exclusion of
all aliens from admission to the bar. 413 U.S. at 725-27. Accord, Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F.
Supp. 913, 921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), prob. urir, noted, 436 U.S. 902 (1978) (No. 76-808).
32. See Mendoza v. City of Miami, 483 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1973) (municipal civil service);
Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (probation officer), vacated and
remanded, 436 U.S. 901 (1978); Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (public
school teacher), prob. jurir. noted, 436 U.S. 902 (1978) (No. 76-808); C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Board of Educ., 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (public contractors), a f'd sub nonm. Lefkowitz
v. C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd., 429 U.S. 1031 (1977); Surmeli v. New York, 412 F. Supp. 394
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (physicians), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978); Wong v. Hohnstrom, 405 F. Supp.
727 (D. Minn. 1975) (pharmacists); Taggert v. Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1975) (notaries
public); Ramos v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 361 (D.P.R. 1974) (federal employment),
vacated as moot, 426 U.S. 916 (1976); Mohamed v. Parks, 352 F. Supp. 518 (D. Mass. 1973)
(municipal employees); Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735 (D. Ariz. 1972) (state civil servants),
aff'd, 413 U.S. 902 (1973); Teitscheid v. Leopold, 342 F. Supp. 299 (D. Vt. 1971) (state employees);
Younus v. Shabat, 336 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (college professors); In re Parks, 484 P.2d
690 (Alas. 1971) (attorneys); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1969) (public works employees); Herriot v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 48, 500 P.2d 101
(1972) (city transit employees).
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Sugarman dictum in defining positions within the political community
that "participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of
broad public policy" from which states may exclude aliens.33 Federal
courts have recognized the nexus between the political community and
employment as a teacher,34 notary public, 35 lawyer,36 and probation of-
ficer vested with the discretionary powers of a peace officer.37 Yet,
33. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
729 (1973) (footnote omitted):
[L]awyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet,
they are not officials of the government by virtue of being lawyers. Nor does the status
of holding a license to practice law place one so close to the core of the political process
as to make him a formulator of government policy.
See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977): "In re Griffiths. . .reflects the narrowness of the
[Sugarman] exception." Id at 11; Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 436 U.S. 901 (1978): "We read the reference in Sugarman to the 'political
community' for which the State may prescribe citizenship as a requisite of office as being confined
to high policy making officers." Id at 170. The court held that a citizenship requirement for
deputy probation officers did not fall within the Sugarman exception. Id at 171; see Appellant's
Reply Brief at 3, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). See generally Employment Discrimination
Against Aliens, supra note 10, at 365-66.
34. Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), prob. juris noted, 436 U.S. 902
(1978) (No. 76-808). The Norwick court recognized the "strong nexus between the classroom and
the political community." Id at 920. Preservation of the conception of the political community,
however, did not justify the exclusion of all aliens from teaching in public schools. Id at 921-22.
35. Taggart v. Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1975). The court indicated that an oath of
office administered to notaries, rather than a complete exclusion of aliens, would satisfy the state's
interest in insuring that notaries remain impartial public officers. Id at 740.
36. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). See note 32 supra and accompanying text,
37. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded, 436
U.S. 901 (1978). In Chavez-Salido, a three-judge court unanimously held invalid a California law
requiring citizenship as a prerequisite for appointment to any position designated as a peace of-
ficer. Id at 171. The statute defines approximately 80 different jobs as peace officers, ranging
from deputy fire wardens and college campus police to inspectors for the Bureau of Furniture and
Bedding Inspection. Ad at 169 n.22.
The court examined the powers of a deputy probation officer to determine if the statutory
classification restricting aliens fell within the Sugarman exception. See notes 24-31 supra and
accompanying text. A probation officer has discretionary power to recommend sentences, prepare
presentence investigation reports, and determine custody questions involving juveniles, Id at 171.
The court determined, however, that it is not the kind of executive or policymaking position from
which Sugarman allows the exclusion of aliens:
Important as those duties are, we cannot characterize a deputy probation officer as an
employee who participates "directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy... " [citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)] Since a
compelling state interest appears only when the requirement of citizenship is confined to
positions of that type, the statute must be condemned. . . . As in GrilAths, we would
find that the duties of a deputy probation officer "hardly involve matters of state policy
or acts of such unique responsibility as to entrust them only to citizens."
Id at 171 (citation omitted). See Appellant's Reply Brief at 3, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978). Contra, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Appellee's Motion to Affirm at 4: "Nor is
it apparent how the voter, legislator, or high executive performs a more important function in
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none of these positions is so close to the core of representative govern-
ment3 1 to justify the exclusion of aliens. On the other hand, aliens are
lawfully excluded from jury service39 and certain elective of-
fices4°-positions commonly identified with the notion of a "political
community. 
4 1
In Foley P. Connelie,4 2 the Supreme Court opined that the exclusion
of aliens from positions in the state police force43 was a matter "firmly
within the state's constitutional prerogatives."'  The Court reasoned
that although the state police function does not include policy formula-
tion per se,45 it does require the exercise of a variety of discretionary
powers that significantly affect members of the political community.46
The discretion in making an arrest,47 conducting a search and seizure,48
and otherwise invading the privacy of individuals49 represents the dele-
gation of important public policy responsibilities to police officers.-"
The police function, therefore, includes responsibilities that strike at
the core of the political process.5' Thus state police officers fall within
the Sugarman exception of positions from which states may lawfully
representative government than does the State police officer who investigates subversion and de-
cides when to make an arrest, an act that necessarily results in the deprivation of individual
liberty."
38, See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973). See notes 29-31 siupra and accompanying
text
39. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 322 (1970); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518
F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975); Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Md. 1974), af'dmem.,
426 U.S. 913 (1976); Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affid, 435 U.S. 291
(1978). See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1976) (grand and petit jurors must be chosen from citizen pop-
ulation).
40. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (citizenship for seven years required for holding office in the
House of Representatives); id § 3, cl. 3 (citizenship for nine years required for office of Senator);
id art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (President must be natural born citizen). See note 67 infra.
41. See note 67 infra.
42. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
43. See note 3 supra.
44. 435 U.S. at 296,
45. Id at 297.
46. Id See Appellee's Motion to Affirm at 3. "He [police officers] must.., make decisions
which are political, social, and psychological in character and 'very much affected by the demo-
crmttc nature of American society.'" Id (quoting Remington, The Role 0fPolice in a Democratic
Society, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 361, 365 (1965)).
47. 435 U.S. at 297-98.
48. Id
49. Id at 297.
50. Id
51. Id at 297-300.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/14
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exclude aliens.52
The Court found it unnecessary for the New York statutory classifi-
cation to "clear the high hurdle of strict scrutiny" because of the special
nature of the police function. 3 The suspect status accorded legislation
discriminating solely on the basis of alienage is limited to legislation
striking at the aliens' ability to exist in the community.5 4  Conse-
quently, New York's legislative scheme did not employ a suspect
classification55 and therefore need only bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate legislative purpose. 6 Because states may presume citizens
are more familiar and sympathetic to American traditions, 57 the exclu-
sion of aliens is a rational means to ensure the right to be governed by
one's citizen peers.5
In dissent, Justice Marshall urged that the Sugarman exception ap-
plies only to policy-shaping positions and therefore the execution of
policy inherent in the police function does not bring officers within its
ambit.5 9 State troopers have no role in shaping policy, but instead
merely apply predetermined policy to specific factual settings.60
Justice Stevens concurred with this narrow reading of the scope of
the Sugarman exception.6 Moreover, he asserted an individual deter-
52. "The office of policeman is in no sense one of 'the common occupations of the commu-
nity' ... " Id at 298.
53. Id at 295.
54. Id
55. Id at 295-96.
56. Id
57. Id at 299-300.
58. Id at 298.
59. Id at 302-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that Sugarman should not
be read as defining classifications of employment positions that trigger a standard ofjudicial scru-
tiny less demanding than normally accorded classifications requiring strict scrutiny. Rather, the
narrow exception may be read as describing those positions that further a compelling or overrid-
ing state interest. Id at 303 n.l. The Court's inquiry, therefore, focused on a determination of
whether the state police function involved direct participation in "the formulation, execution, or
review of broad public policy" within the Sugarman dictum. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
647 (1973). For further discussion of whether the police function is largely discretionary or minis-
terial, see notes 32-40 supra and accompanying text; note 70 infra. See generally Breitel, Controls
in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CH. L. REv. 427 (1960); Davis, An Approach to Legal Control
ofthe Police, 52 TEx. L. REv. 703 (1974); Finch & Thomas, Exercise of Discretionary Decision
Making by Police, 54 N.D.L. REv. 61 (1977); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Crimi-
nal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960);
Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 DUKE L.J. 717.
60. 435 U.S. at 303-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Their [police] discretion when utilized
involves the application of factual judgments; they apply the law's requirements to their percep-
tual judgments." Brief for Appellant at 11.
61. 435 U.S. at 310-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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mination of each applicant's qualifications would satisfy the state's in-
terest in maintaining a loyal police force sympathetic to American
traditions and mores.6
2
Foley portends the abandonment of recognition of alienage as "sus-
pect" for a growing number of state employment statutory classifica-
tions. The New York statute63 imposes a blanket exclusion of all aliens
from all positions within the state police force.' The state has a com-
pelling interest in defining those positions essential to the preservation
of the political community.65 The state can constitutionally protect that
interest by enacting a narrowly drawn statute excluding aliens from po-
sitions properly within the Sugarman exception.66 That state police-
men, because of their discretionary powers, fall within this rubric is
doubtful.67  In any event, regardless of the equal protection standard
used to review similar statutes, the exclusion of all aliens on the basis of
nonjob-related characteristics is overbroad.68  The Court's conclusion
that it is rational to assume citizens are more sympathetic to American
traditions and mores69 indicates the exclusion of aliens is merely a
proxy for disloyalty. In the past, however, the Court has recognized
that concern for disloyalty does not justify exclusion of aliens as a class
62. Id. at 308 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. See note 4 supra.
64. There are three units in the New York state police force, each charged with different
responsibilities. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 215-216 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
65. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); see note
24 supra.
66. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
67. See 435 U.S. at 302-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp.
158, 169-72 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded, 436 U.S. 901 (1978); Foley v. Conneie, 419
F. Supp. 889, 899 (1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), aft'd, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); note 37 supra.
68. See 435 U.S. at 300 (Stewart, J., concurring); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
[Als Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State's historical and consti-
tutional powers to define the qualifications of voters [citing Perkins v. Smith, 370 F.
Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), a]7'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976)] or of "elective or important nonelec-
tive" officials "who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy".. . . In re Grifliths. . .reflects the narrowness of the exception.
Id at 11. See notes 29-31, 32-37 supra and accompanying text. Cf Foley v. Connelie, 419 F.
Supp. 889, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) ("There is not a shred of evidence in the
record of this case to indicate, much less prove, that a properly tested, selected, and trained resi-
dent alien would be less competent to perform the duties of a New York state trooper."), afjd, 435
U.S. 291 (1978). See generally Nowak, supra note 26, at 1093-94 (If alienage is considered a
neutral classification, rather than a suspect one, a statute that classifies on the basis of alienage
would only be valid if there is a factually demonstrable rational relationship to a legitimate legis-
lative end).
Professor Tribe suggests that the nature of the police function will limit the application of Foley
to other occupations. L. TmB, AMERICAN CoNsrTrrUTIONAL LAW 97 (Supp. 1979).
69. 435 U.S. at 299-300.
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from the opportunity to seek employment.7 0 Citizenship is no assur-
ance of loyalty; similarly, alienage, by itself, is no guarantee of
disloyalty.7'
The state has available constitutionally less burdensome means to
achieve its legitimate end. Administration of oaths of allegiance, indi-
vidual testing, interviewing, and careful selection of qualified candi-
dates72 would protect the state's interest and the aliens' right to
work-the essence of freedom and opportunity.73 The Court's decision
in Foley v. Connelie, therefore, represents an injudicious broadening of
the definition of those positions from which states may lawfully exclude
aliens and a concomitant constriction of aliens' employment rights.
70. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). "Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens
are unsuited. . . be a justification for a wholesale ban." Id at 725. See notes 14-17 supra and
accompanying text.
71. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 10, at 346-51.
72. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 725 (1973); Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 899
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), af§'d, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
73. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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